Erik J. Wielenberg, ROBUST ETHICS: THE METAPHYSICS AND EPISTEMOLOGY OF GODLESS NORMATIVE REALISM by Menuge, Angus
Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian 
Philosophers 
Volume 33 Issue 2 Article 10 
4-1-2016 
Wielenberg, ROBUST ETHICS: THE METAPHYSICS AND 
EPISTEMOLOGY OF GODLESS NORMATIVE REALISM 
Angus Menuge 
Follow this and additional works at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy 
Recommended Citation 
Menuge, Angus (2016) "Wielenberg, ROBUST ETHICS: THE METAPHYSICS AND EPISTEMOLOGY OF 
GODLESS NORMATIVE REALISM," Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers: 
Vol. 33 : Iss. 2 , Article 10. 
Available at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy/vol33/iss2/10 
This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at ePLACE: preserving, learning, and 
creative exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian 
Philosophers by an authorized editor of ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative exchange. 
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Robust Ethics: The Metaphysics and Epistemology of Godless Normative Real-
ism, by Erik J. Wielenberg. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014. 196 
pages. $65.00 (hardback).
ANGUS MENUGE, Concordia University Wisconsin
Erik Wielenberg espouses an interesting position in metaethics—godless 
normative realism—which maintains that objective moral properties exist 
and are knowable, whether or not God exists. Wielenberg claims that 
moral properties supervene on non-moral properties, but he agrees with 
G. E. Moore that moral properties are non-natural: they are not identical 
to, reducible to, or constituted by non-moral properties. Wielenberg also 
agrees with the many critics of supervenience that it asserts, without ex-
plaining, a “weird” (16) form of covariation between non-moral and moral 
properties (11–12). This motivates his metaphysical project (chapter 1) of 
providing a non-theistic account of why this covariation obtains.
The core of Wielenberg’s account is the making relation. For example, 
“the natural fact that an act is a piece of deliberate cruelty makes that act 
morally wrong” (16). Of course, we then want to know what “making” 
means. Wielenberg suggests it is a “particularly robust” type of causation 
(18), which does not require cause and effect to be linked by a natural law, 
where cause and effect are simultaneous, and where the cause metaphysi-
cally necessitates the effect. Thus the making relation provides some ex-
planation of the supervenience of the moral on the non-moral. However, 
if one asks why the making relation obtains, Wielenberg asserts that it is a 
brute fact, and points out that every account appeals to brute facts sooner 
or later (24).
An obvious objection is that the making relation is at least as mysterious 
as supervenience. Consider one of Mother Teresa’s supreme acts of kind-
ness and a supreme act of cruelty by one of the Romanian communists 
that tortured Richard Wurmbrand. If we inspect the natural properties of 
these acts (those properties studied by the natural sciences), there seems 
to be no connection with any moral properties. In a godless world, there 
is no underlying telos according to which some natural properties con-
form to the way the world is supposed to be, while others do not. Rather, 
these properties simply are distributed in a certain way: there is no reason 
to think that the distribution underlying Mother Teresa’s act of kindness 
is morally good, or that the distribution underlying the communist tor-
turer’s act of cruelty is morally bad.
Further, it does not seem that Wielenberg’s account is sufficient to an-
swer a number of skeptical challenges. Suppose the communist torturer 
asserts that the cruelty of his act makes it right, and that the kindness of 
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Mother Teresa’s act makes it wrong. If the making relation is a brute fact, 
there are no resources to refute immoralists and psychopaths who simply 
assert that the specific brute relations are different from those that a nice 
guy like Wielenberg assumes to obtain. The problem is that the making 
relation does not explain the particular patterns of covariance between 
non-moral and moral properties we may hope for. We need to know what 
it is about the natural properties of Mother Teresa’s act of kindness that 
makes it good, and what it is about the natural properties of the torturer’s 
act that makes it bad.
Wielenberg is aware that many will see an obvious advantage in a 
theistic foundation for ethics, according to which the moral properties of 
human actions are rooted in the nature of God. In chapter 2, he responds 
to this challenge and his main strategy is a tu quoque argument. Wherever 
the theist claims that godless normative realism appeals to unexplained 
brute facts, Wielenberg shows that the theist makes similar appeals. For 
example, on Robert Adams’s version of divine command theory (DCT), 
Good = God, which implies that there are “ethical facts that are substan-
tive, metaphysically necessary and brute” (43).
Wielenberg is right that DCT appeals to brute ethical facts about God. 
But not all brute facts are equal: they can be “at home” or “not at home” in 
a worldview. Since theism already postulates the existence of a necessary 
being who is perfectly good, brute moral facts about God are not surpris-
ing and they do ground explanations of the morality of human actions. 
For example, God makes it the case that human beings have special value 
because He makes them in His image—the image of a supremely valuable 
being. But without God, there is no obvious reason to expect the emer-
gence of any moral properties, because the natural base properties are val-
ueless. So Wielenberg needs to explain what it is about the configuration 
of certain valueless properties that necessitates the emergence of value.
William Lane Craig has argued that in a godless world, human beings 
are no more valuable than dogs or lumps of slime. Wielenberg replies by 
appealing to special features of human beings: they “can reason, suffer, 
fall in love, [and] set goals for themselves” (51). However, this riposte is 
insufficient, because from a godless point of view, these abilities simply 
reflect the particular way human adaptations have been shaped by natural 
selection, and there is no naturalistic reason to say that our mode of adap-
tation is superior to that of other creatures. As James Rachels pointed out, 
“We are not entitled—not on evolutionary grounds, at any rate—to regard 
our own adaptive behavior as ‘better’ or ‘higher’ than that of a cockroach, 
who, after all, is adapted equally well to life in its own environmental 
niche” (Created From Animals: The Moral Implications of Darwinism [Oxford 
University Press, 1990], 70).
There are further problems with Wielenberg’s assertion that “evolu-
tionary processes have endowed us with certain unalienable rights and 
duties” by giving us the “right cognitive capacities” (56). The account 
conflicts with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), which 
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speaks of “the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights 
of all members of the human family” (http://www.un.org/en/documents/
udhr/). The problem is that cognitive capacities are not uniformly distrib-
uted (some humans lack them altogether) and they come in degrees. So, as 
J. P. Moreland asks, “Why should we treat all people equally in any respect 
in the face of manifest inequalities among them?” (The Recalcitrant Imago 
Dei [SCM Press, 2009], 144) Just how can universal and equal moral rights 
be necessitated by natural capacities not all humans have and which come 
in varying degrees?
Wielenberg thinks that “to have an obligation just is to have decisive 
reasons to perform a certain action” (57), but it is hard to see how one can 
be obligated to a free-standing reason. One needs to recognize an authori-
tative source for the reason. If someone claiming to be king provides me 
“decisive reasons” to do something, still I am not obligated to do it unless 
I recognize that he is the king. Indeed Wielenberg seems inconsistent on 
this matter as he later complains that a problem for DCT is that “reason-
able non-believers” (77) might discover God’s command revealed in their 
conscience but have no obligation to obey it because they do not recognize 
its ultimate source (79). Yet defenders of DCT can note that God delegates 
authority to faculties (Rom: 2: 14–15) or people (Rom. 13), so unbelievers 
can recognize secondary authorities He has instituted without recogniz-
ing Him.
Chapter 3 shifts to moral epistemology. Earlier in the book, Wielenberg 
asserts that “moral properties themselves are epiphenomenal” (13–14) 
which makes it hard to see how we could know them. To address this 
question Wielenberg draws on the idea that cognition is divided into “Sys-
tem 1” (the adaptive unconscious) and “System 2” (the conscious mind). 
On this view, if x’s instantiation of the non-moral property N makes x 
instantiate moral property M, S can reliably believe that M, provided:
(1) System 1 reliably classifies x as N;
(2) This causes S to believe that x is M;
(3) The process type is reliable;
(4) S has no undefeated defeaters for the belief that x is M. (94)
There are many worries about this account. Most fundamentally, since 
M is epiphenomenal it is hard to see how S can possess the concept of M, 
and without that concept nothing can cause S to believe that x is M. But 
even if S does have the concept of M, the fact that System 1 reliably classi-
fies x as N is no reason to expect that S will believe that x is M. In fact, it is 
not clear why S should have a specifically moral belief at all: for example, 
why should not x’s being N cause an emotional reaction but no moral 
judgment? Just because x’s being N makes x to be M is no reason to expect 
that x’s being N will cause S to believe that x is M.
In the last chapter, Wielenberg takes on the “Evolutionary Debunkers” 
(Gilbert Harman, Michael Ruse, Sharon Street, and Richard Joyce) who 
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argue that evolution invites moral skepticism because it offers an account 
of (some) of our moral judgments which nowhere depends on there being 
any moral facts. Wielenberg does not offer a general response but cites 
his view of human rights as an example of how this objection might be 
evaded. He thinks genetic interests account for our understanding of a 
moral barrier around ourselves and other kin (137–139) and that the bar-
rier could be extended to non-kin by the “Likeness Principle” which, based 
on people’s known properties, “leads us to attribute to all human beings 
the same underlying essence” (142). But postulating this essence would 
not show that belief in universal human rights is true. The idea of a human 
essence might be a useful fiction, but it seems to conflict with naturalistic 
evolution. Ernst Mayr noted that because no fixed species are recognized, 
“the essentialist philosophies of Aristotle and Plato are incompatible with 
evolutionary thinking” (Population, Species, and Evolution [Harvard Uni-
versity Press, 1970], 4). And on evolutionary grounds, just why is someone 
who can reliably discriminate between kin and non-kin morally wrong to 
reject the rights of the latter?
Wielenberg claims knowledge of human rights is compatible with 
evolution because the same cognitive faculties that make us believe we 
have these rights also confer those rights (145). But if moral properties are 
epiphenomenal, they play no role in shaping our moral judgments, and 
for any given situation there are more adaptive but false moral beliefs 
than true ones. So it seems unlikely our moral beliefs would be reliable. 
Wielenberg admits that evolution itself is not truth-tracking but suggests 
it still might give us faculties that are (164). But how likely is it that it 
would?
Wielenberg argues that the answer depends on the extent to which 
natural laws permit species to emerge with radically different moral 
principles (167). Street suggests alternative evolutionary histories: we 
might have evolved like lions (males kill offspring that are not their 
own), or social insects (who sacrifice individuals for the collective good). 
Wielenberg responds that the same factors that give us the right cogni-
tive capacities to be moral beings make us more protective of offspring 
(170–172). But surely the same capacity to make moral judgments could 
coexist with very different social organization. Darwin argued that “If 
. . . men were reared under precisely the same conditions as hive-bees, 
there can hardly be a doubt that our unmarried females would . . . think 
it a sacred duty to kill their brothers” (The Descent of Man [Amherst, 
NY: Prometheus Books, 1998], 102). And there does not seem to be any 
incompatibility with having functional moral faculties and making 
radically different judgments about who is valuable. Even in the actual 
world, we see social organizations that depend on slavery, apartheid, 
the caste system, tribal warfare and genocide. So why cannot the skeptic 
urge that it is easy to see how we could all evolve to depend on slaves 
or to build group cohesion by exterminating others in tribal warfare? In 
such societies many clearly do not believe that all human beings have 
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the same moral worth. Why, on the basis of natural properties, are they 
wrong? The answer is not that they lack functional moral faculties.
Wielenberg’s book is well-organized, very clearly written and will 
doubtless engender a very wide-ranging discussion. But in my view, the 
book does not succeed in developing a plausible metaphysics and episte-
mology for godless normative realism.
